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Abstract Among newly industrializing economies, Taiwan represents an archetypical
example of a country in the process of economic catching up with institutional
environments standing somewhere between Western and transition countries. Thus,
Taiwan’s privatization experience may provide a means to assess the generalizability of
conclusions drawn from prior research conducted in both kinds of countries. In the face
of changing economic and political environments, Taiwan revamped its blueprint for
privatization in 1989 as a major plank of its economic shift toward liberalization.
Although it has proceeded on a trial-and-error basis, the policy has thus far yielded
substantial though mixed results. This study systematically reviews Taiwan’s policy
design and implementation of privatization, which originally was modeled on but later
diverged from the Western experience as a result of the immature institutional settings
and political compromises in various regards. Taiwan’s privatization, in a relative small
scale to those in transition economies, is characterized by a set of stylized policy
initiatives that provide a reference point for other developing countries.
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1 Introduction
After World War II, among many governments of developing countries, state
ownership coupled with central planning seemed to offer an accelerated route to
economic development (Cook and Minogue 1990). The postwar rise of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) ideally would make up for both the absence of well-developed
markets and the lack of indigenous private entrepreneurship (Astbury 1996). During
the 1980s and 1990s however, a convincing body of accumulated evidence began to
suggest that SOEs underperform in all operations and functions relative to private
enterprises. Therefore, as more and more countries are adopting privatization
programs, the last decade of the twentieth century saw the largest scale of state asset
sales in history (Parker 2003).
Despite the voluminous empirical literature examining the rationale and impact of
privatization (for extensive reviews, see Shirley and Walsh 2001; Megginson and
Netter 2001), research on this subject mainly considers the experience of Western
and transitional economies rather than the economies of developing countries. It
therefore cannot indicate whether, or to what extent, the performance implications of
privatization apply to newly industrializing countries, especially smaller market
economies that contain some characteristics of central planning in their policy
designs. Among them, Taiwan represents an archetypical example that has worked to
develop its economy in immature institutional settings, including a capital market
with limited absorptive capacity, a relatively inexperienced and unstable policy
framework, and a less–than–harmonious relationship between the executive and
legislative branches of government. Therefore, assessing the case of Taiwan’s
privatization may indicate the generalizability of conclusions drawn from prior
research that has been conducted in both transitional and Western economies and
further serve as a reference for other developing countries.
Taiwan’s achievements in economic development, derived largely from a series of
successful industrial development strategies in the 1950s and 1960s, have long been
recognized worldwide and earned Taiwan a place among Asia’s “four little dragons.”
In the 1970s, the government started to pursue a new strategy of structural
adjustment, aimed not only at fostering new high-tech industries to replace the
capital-intensive industries that had reached the mature stage of their life cycle but
also at reducing the role of the public sector in economic activities. In the early
1980s, Taiwan had just emerged from a second energy crisis and the ensuing global
stagflation by instituting a domestic demand stimulus scheme that included a series
of the state-dominated capital intensive projects.1 In contrast, in response to these
changing economic conditions worldwide, industrialized countries understood that
only by reducing the role of the public sector could they sustain economic growth.
This realization spawned the trend toward privatization, which soon caught on
around the world, including in Taiwan.
1 These policies largely have been successful; Taiwan has one of the world’s highest standards of living,
constitutes the seventeenth largest economy in the world, is the fourteenth largest exporter, and ranks as
the fourth largest holder of foreign exchange reserves. Moreover, Taiwan’s per capita gross national
product (GNP) rose from $1,100 in the 1950s to $11,600 in the 1990s and then $16,500 in 2007.
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Varied and rich privatization experiences documented in advanced countries make
the transfer of the Western experience to developing countries almost inevitable,
because countries without a privatization program face a powerful demonstration
effect, as well as increasing pressure to follow international norms in implementing
similar policies (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). However, as no single glove can fit all
hands, policy imitation cannot simply involve posting one approach from one
country to another. Instead, it must consider the acceptability of a specific method of
privatization for each host country, as well as how each country interprets and
operationalizes that policy (Parker 1999). Because SOEs once were the primary
means to support economic growth in Taiwan, the government exploited them
broadly to serve its economic, social, and political goals. However, recognizing that
the state’s retreat from economic activities had become a global trend and that SOEs
represented obstacles to economic development in ever-changing environments,
Taiwan chose to follow the same course as many advanced economies already had
taken in the 1980s.
The privatization of SOEs in Taiwan began with a conference of social elites in
1984, which concluded with a policy slogan: “Internationalization, liberalization and
institutionalization as the objectives of continued economic growth.” Although
Taiwan soon encountered its first two SOE bankruptcies in the mid-1980s, the
concept of market liberalization was not incorporated into the government’s decision
to reduce its presence in the market until the late 1980s, when Taiwan’s government
finally revamped its blueprint for privatization2 (Wu 2006). Although privatization
of SOEs gradually became a major plank of its economic policy, the policy generally
was carried out by trial and error because of inexperienced execution and immature
institutional settings. Thus far, 39 privatizations are complete, following various
methods across different sectors and yielding proceeds of some US$11 billion,
though with mixed records of post-privatization performance outcomes.
Although much has been written about the impact of privatization and the
preconditions of its success, remarkably little discussion addresses how the
privatization decision process should be structured, especially at the state level
(Kettl 1993; Wallin 1997). Because the experience of Taiwan’s privatization reflects,
to some extent, the rationale and constraints of policy formulation in a newly
developing country, this study systematically reviews Taiwan’s policy design for and
implementation of privatization, as well as shedding light on other developing
countries which are eager to follow the Western privatization experience. The paper
is organized as follows: The next section outlines the key features of Taiwan’s SOEs
and addresses the major elements of its policy framework. Section three examines
the policy priorities of privatizing SOEs of different types and their outcomes. The
next section is an attempt to quantify the costs and benefits of implementing
privatization since 1989 and concisely evaluate the post-privatization performance
outcomes. The paper concludes with some suggestion to the policy designs in other
developing countries.
2 The first round of privatization in Taiwan was embarked on as a supportive measure for a land reform
program in the early 1950s, under which the government gave landowners shares in SOEs in exchange for
the surrender of tracts of their land. Although some partial privatizations took place for policy purposes in
the following decades, none touched on the goals of improving efficiency or social welfare.
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2 The policy framework of Taiwan’s privatization
After World War II, the Taiwanese economy went through a long period of
rehabilitation. Industries built up by the Japanese during their colonial rule were
handed over to and nationalized by the Taiwanese government. The process of
modern economic development launched in 1952 when SOEs became the
foundations for industrialization. These SOEs had a significant share in Taiwan’s
economy, but the private sector gradually replaced their importance in the 1980s.
Because Taiwan is a free economy with some elements of central planning in its
economic development, the government gets involved in the market mainly through
SOEs to maintain market order and address the indigenous development of
industries. To demonstrate the contribution of SOEs to Taiwan’s economic structure,
consider their percentage shares of gross domestic production, capital formation, and
government finance, as shown in Table 1. The figures peak in the 1970s3 and start to
decline in the 1980s.
For example, SOEs accounted for 5% of GDP in 1951, rising to 9.4% in 1971,
and reaching a peak in 1981. By 2001, the figure had declined to 9.4% and stood at
just 7.6% in 2005. A similar trend also emerges for the contribution of SOEs to gross
domestic capital formation and government finance. For example, SOEs accounted
for 16.2% of capital formation in 1961, 20.4% in 1971, and only 10.2% in 2005.
This decline in the relative importance of SOEs for the economy resulted not only
from the retreat of state ownership, starting in the early 1990s, but also from the
rapid growth of the private sector.
After a full launch of privatization in the 1990s and early 2000s, 21 SOEs
continued to operate in Taiwan at the end of 2005 (see Table 2). Their combined
work force numbered 177,526, equivalent to about 2.3% of the national labor force.
Although SOEs have been declining in terms of number and economic importance,
due to the continuous promotion of privatization, they remain dominant in several
sectors, including telecommunications, electricity, petroleum, railway transportation,
tobacco and wines, water supply, and shipbuilding.
3 In the mid-1970s, the Taiwanese government launched its Ten Major Projects, which included setting up
several SOEs in basic industries and capital-intensive investments in infrastructure. These projects helped
the Taiwanese economy ride out the recession following the first oil crisis.
Table 1 The contribution of SOEs to Taiwan’s economy
Year 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2005
% share of GDP 5.0 8.2 9.4 12.1 10.3 9.4 7.6
% share of domestic capital formation 24.2 16.2 20.4 30.1 21.5 12.1 10.2
dividend gain as % of government
net revenues
0.002 0.005 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.016 0.011
Monopoly tax income as % of
government net revenues
0.382 0.040 0.046 0.045 0.035 0.043 0.027
Source: The Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS), Executive Yuan, Taiwan,
2006.
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Despite its economic nature, privatization is a highly political activity that
requires careful nurturance, consensus building, and compromise. In addition to the
executive’s initiative, privatization involves a multistage process, from laying out the
legal basis, to establishing an appropriate administration for promoting privatization,
through completing the sale, which offers ample scope for disruptions, amendments,
or even reversals of a given privatization plan. To minimize the possibility that
privatization collapses, domestic champions of the policy must create and maintain
political support, both within and outside government, and perhaps even in the face
of strong resistance from interests that expect to be disadvantaged, such as SOE
labor unions and politicians who use SOEs for political patronage. Why should
politicians, government officials, and SOE managers give up the rents they may gain
from state ownership? In practice, tension likely is inherent within any privatization
program, pitting the forces of change against those opposed to change, with the latter
willing to invest resources, up to the value of the rents they receive from the status quo.
In contrast, those who may gain rents from privatization, such as the general public
and perhaps some SOE employees, often are too diverse to commit their resources.
This section specifies eight major elements of the policy framework of Taiwan’s
privatization, including the legal basis of its policy, the organizational framework for
policy implementation, the scope of privatization, the pace of privatization in concert
with market liberalization, the privatization methods adopted, considerations of
employee rights and interests, the fast-track mechanism for financially troubled
SOEs, and the management of residual state holdings.
2.1 The legal basis of Taiwan’s privatization policy
A democracy requires a legal basis for any policy that might affect people’s rights
and interests. Whether a country needs to enact a privatization law depends on its
legal and political situation and the specific characteristics of the enterprises to be
privatized (Guislain 1997). In some countries, the government may not require any
special enabling legislation to privatize state owned properties, either because
constitutional principles do not demand such laws or because SOE legislation or
other laws already provide the necessary legal framework.
As one of the countries within the civil law tradition, Taiwan always demands a
law when the issues in question involve rights and obligation of government and





Telecom & Transportation 7
Financial 3
Total assets US$624.9 billion
Total owners’ equity US$109.6 billion
Annual sales US$81.2 billion
Profits before tax US$6.2 billion
Employees 177,526
Table 2 Taiwan’s SOEs in 2005
a Four special organizations
(foreign branches of some state-
owned banks) are excluded.
Source: 2006 audited general
budget, the DGBAS, Executive
Yuan, Taiwan.
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private entities. The legal basis for Taiwan’s privatization policy rests on the Statute
for Transforming SOEs into Privately Owned Enterprises (STSP),4 whose basic
approach is to set general rules for the privatization process for all chosen SOEs.5
Unlike the approach used by many countries that legislate specifically for each case
of privatization, the general rules set out in the STSP are efficient with regard to the
law-making process but sometimes fail to address the specific situations of SOEs
properly and thus can create problems for authorities charged with carrying out
privatization.
Figure 1 illustrates the legal framework of Taiwan’s privatization policy. The
STSP provides the platform for all relevant measures and, with its enforcement rules,
collectively regulates basic obligations and rights of all parties—including the
government, SOEs, and their employees—involved in the privatization process.
They also empower competent authorities to create detailed provisions for specific
matters, such as the allocation of priority shares to employees, redundancy
payments, and so on.
2.2 Organizational design for promoting privatization
Because they are owned by central or local governments in Taiwan, SOEs are
administered by the line ministries, which are also responsible for conducting their
privatization. When the government revamped its privatization efforts in the late
1980s, an ad-hoc committee (Steering Committee for Promoting Privatization of
SOEs [SCPPS]), composed of line ministries and other relevant agencies, was
4 The STSP, first promulgated in 1953 in support of the land reform program, covered only the basic
concept of privatization. A major revision of the STSP in 1991 provided consideration of employees’
interests and rights.
5 According to Article 5 of the STSP, when the authority in charge of an SOE believes it no longer needs
to be operated by the state, it may propose that the SOE be privatized, and privatization will be conducted
upon receipt of the Premier’s approval.
The Statute for Transforming State-Owned Enterprises into
Privately-Owned Enterprises (STSP)
Empower the line
ministries to draw up the
detailed regulations
Administrative regulations on







Fig. 1 The Legal framework of Taiwan’s privatization policy
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established to oversee the privatization process on behalf of the Premier.6 Although
the experience of other countries has demonstrated that a holding company likely
performs more efficiently than a bureaucratic agency (Pirie 1988), the organizational
framework for managing SOEs or promoting privatization in Taiwan is substantially
restricted by law. However, the passage of a package of government reform laws by
the legislature in the near future should provide a more flexible organizational
design.
2.3 Scope of Taiwan’s privatization
When privatization first was promoted in Taiwan in the 1950s, the law excluded
certain SOEs from privatization on grounds of the public interest or national security.
However, when the government reconsidered the scope of privatization in its first
revision of the STSP in the late 1980s, it revised the statute to provide for the
privatization of any SOE, assuming that the competent authority, having given
consideration to the market situation and industrial or technological changes bearing
on the need to keep the SOE, proposed its privatization and the Premier approved
that proposal. This revision of the STSP to broaden the scope of privatization gives
authorities more flexibility to promote privatization among all kinds of SOEs.
2.4 Paces of privatization and market deregulation
If the introduction of competition can solve the efficiency problem of SOEs, there is
little need to consider the nature of ownership. However, if competition is not the
only factor that influences SOE operations, the focus must expand beyond the
market to include ownership changes. Privatization plans that neglect competition-
enhancing measures consistently are questioned with regard to their efficacy (Caves
1990). While experience of advanced countries shows that for privatization to be
successful, the regulatory framework needs to be reformed. Privatization can in turn
make market-oriented regulatory policies easier to implement.
Numerous studies acknowledge that ownership per se cannot guarantee positive
outcomes of privatized enterprises (e.g., Shleifer and Visnhy 1994; Nellis 1994), and
one of the critical components of Taiwan’s privatization program is aligning with
forces of market liberalization, particularly among the state-owned utility industries.
For example, Chung-Hwa Telecommunication Corporation (CHT), which is the
corporate form of the competent authority, Directorate General of Telecommunica-
tions (DGT), exercised a legal monopoly in Taiwan’s telecom market for nearly half
a century, so authorities decided to address both market structure and ownership
issues in concert to improve the efficiency of the telecom market overall. With the
passage of three telecom bills, namely, the Telecom Act, the Organizational Statute
of DGT, and the Statute of CHT, in early 1996, the telecom market was greatly
deregulated, retreating government’s role from business operations to regulatory
6 The SCPPS acts as an ad hoc organization; the Council for Economic Planning and Development
(CEPD) remains in charge of all secretarial tasks supporting the SCPPS’s operations. The chairperson of
the CEPD also convenes the SCPPS, and the Sectoral Planning Department of the CEPD acts as the main
policy support staff for the working aspect of the SCPPS.
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functions and opening a variety of telecom services to the private sector. Share-issue
privatization of CHT was then planned and implemented. CHT was privatized on
August 12th, 2005 with the government’s holding down to less than 50%.
Similarly, the schedule for privatization of another state-owned monopoly, China
Petroleum Corporation (CPC), followed market deregulation. The schedule opened
Taiwan’s petroleum market in steps, well before CPC’s scheduled privatization. The
first private naphtha cracker, for example, was approved for construction in 1997
and already operating at full capacity in 2000; market deregulation became
implemented at the end of 2001 when the Petroleum Administration Law came
into effect. Although CPC will face unparalleled challenges in the deregulated
market, its market dominance prevails in the short term. In the long term though,
CPC can survive market competition only through privatization.
2.5 Methods of privatization
Privatization in the broadest sense means giving private actors a greater role in
decisions about what, where, and how to produce goods and services. However,
privatization in a narrower sense of divestiture—the sale of SOEs—provides greater
challenges than early advocates envisaged (Berg and Berg 1997). Of the different
approaches to selling SOEs, the method chosen usually reflects the government’s
policy priorities in terms of proceeds, transparency, broadening and deepening
capital markets, better corporate governance, the direct impact of technological or
managerial know-how, and access to markets.
In the early stages of Taiwan’s privatization drive, only by the sale of shares or
assets occurred. However, the second revision of the STSP in 2000 broadened the
approach to five alternatives, including sale of shares, sale of assets through bidding,
formation of a private-owned enterprise by joint venture with private individuals
through contributions in kind, merging companies so that the surviving enterprise
became a private-owned enterprise, and dilution of state-owned capital by new issue.
In adopting any of these five methods, the authorities may effect privatization by
negotiating with a specific counterparty selected through public invitation.
Although other forms of privatization, such as contracting, leasing, and
management contracts, as adopted in advanced countries, have been tested with
some public service providers (e.g., garbage collection, waste disposal, traffic
management, hospital administration), they have not been applied to SOEs in
Taiwan, mainly because of employee issues, as discussed next.
2.6 Employees’ rights and interests (ERI)
In pursuit of a balance between the government’s economic and political aims,
provisions for the legal protection of ERI appeared in the first revision of the STSP
in 1991 and again in the second revision in 2000. Since then, ERI has become a
critical policy design issue. Various compensation measures, including seniority
settlements, insurance compensation, redundancy payments, and priority share
subscriptions (plus favored offerings for long-term shareholding), attempt to reduce
opposition from employees. However, it has proved all but impossible to satisfy
employee demands fully, and confrontations between SOE labor unions and the
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government still arise. Consequently, ERI remains a critical issue and often a
stumbling block in SOE privatization. Figure 2 illustrates Taiwan’s policy design for
ERI, showing that SOE employees receive a variety of legal rights in the time prior
to privatization.
First, to encourage employees to participate in corporate governance through
shareholding, they receive exclusive access to share subscriptions. Observing the
experiences of advanced countries, Taiwan incorporated such an approach into its
policy design in the first revision of the STSP in 1991 to earn employee loyalty to
the company as well as speed up the share sales. Employees may preemptively
subscribe to a specific amount of shares, under the conditions that each employee
may buy shares in value up to 48 months’ salary and that total priority shares for
employees cannot exceed 35% of outstanding shares of that company. Long-term
employee shareholders are also entitled to discounts in subscription price. Thus far,
the percentage of employee shareholding, which is a result of many objective and
subject factors, varies across privatized enterprises and over time.
Second, all full-time employees are entitled to settle for the length of their service
years, a provision specially tailored for Taiwan’s privatization efforts to protect
employees’ seniority benefits. They may then choose to stay with or leave the
company at their own discretion, unless they enter an agreement with the new
employer (which rarely occurs).
Third, those who are unwilling to stay with the privatized enterprise are eligible
for severance pay and insurance compensation.7 Severance pay includes 1 month
salary for notice and 6 months’ salary to cover a reasonable job-seeking period.















• Vocational training &
employment assistance
• Priority shares plus
favored offering for
long-term shareholding
• Conditional job security
Fig. 2 The policy design for employees’ rights and interests during privatization
7 According to Article 8 of the STSP, if employees suffer the loss of pensions because privatization
interrupts the original insurance scheme, they will be duly compensated. The scope of additional payment,
if any, is limited to losses incurred at the time of privatization.
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Anyone who chooses to stay with the enterprise remains eligible to receive such
severance compensation if laid off within 5 years after the privatization.
Fourth, because only profitable SOEs initially were chosen for privatization, the
problem of large-scale employee redundancies did not arise. However, the changing
situation has forced some financially troubled SOEs to close down or privatize in
part. In this situation, the issue of job transfer training or employment assistance
prior to privatization becomes more crucial and therefore is covered by the second
revision of the STSP.8
Studies on self-interested behavior in the public sector note the “capturing power”
of organized groups of SOE employees (Borcherding et al. 1982), arguing that SOE
employees trade votes for laws or regulations that either protect the status quo or
maximize their compensation if the working conditions must change. According to
the experience of other countries, privatization is most likely to succeed if employees
are “bribed” to ensure their minimum opposition (Burton 1987). Since 1991, SOE
employees organized by SOE labor unions in Taiwan have gained increasingly
favorable legal compensation in return for privatization because of their lobbying or
strikes against the government. These efforts have led to the gradual distortion of the
original ideology of policy design.
2.7 Fast-track mechanism for financially troubled SOEs (FTSs)
Originally, the privatization policy design gave SOEs (or employers) the main
responsibility for taking care of employees prior to privatization. Accordingly,
employers (i.e., the SOE) are legally responsible for most compensation, including
seniority settlements and severance pay. Yet financially troubled SOEs cannot afford
the compensation legally required by the STSP.
The Privatization Fund (PF), appropriated from a portion of the proceeds of
privatization, follows a common policy practice adopted in transition countries for
ERI compensation schemes or other capital investments. Incorporated into the
second revision of the STSP, the PF was designed to subsidize FTS payments of ERI
expenditures at the time of privatization. At least four FTSs have been successfully
privatized with the PF’s financial assistance, though demands for assistance may
reach as high as NT$141.5 billion (US$4.1 billion) between 2003 and 2008. When
an SOE experiences financial difficulties, budgetary constraints and parliamentary
interference still frequently prevent authorities from dealing with the problems
decisively.
2.8 Management of residual state holdings
Most privatization programs begin with a period of partial privatization, in which
only noncontrolling shares of firms may be sold on the stock market (Gupta 2005).
In many instances, governments retain residual equity ownership in privatized SOEs
to address any political or societal concerns in the post-privatization period. The
8 According to Article 11 of the STSP, a government-owned enterprise must conduct such services when
necessary. The authority in charge of the enterprise or the competent authority from the labor
administration provides assistance.
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purpose behind retaining these assets often determines whether they remain in state
hands for the longer term or are privatized after market deregulation. Different policy
practices around the world also raise the question of whether state asset management
can substitute for privatization when there is a lack of public support for privati-
zation (OECD 2000).
After promoting some 30 successful privatizations, the Taiwanese government
owns residual holdings in 19 companies, with a total market value of nearly US$8.3
billion, as of 2005. Although state shareholdings in those companies have fallen
below 50% (threshold for legal privatization in Taiwan), the percentage of state-
controlled seats on boards of directors remains at approximately 60% on average. In
other words, the executive branch of the government still exercises substantial
control over privatized SOEs. Thus, the executive branch (bureaucratic control)
remains involved in privatized firms, even after the legislative branch (political
control) removes itself after privatization.
In the early stage of Taiwan’s privatization, state-retained shareholdings in
privatized SOEs seemed justified by several issues, such as reducing the impact of
large share sales on the stock market, continuously implementing government
policies (including stage-by-stage introductions of new regulatory regimes) ,
maintaining market discipline, and helping managers adapt to the competitive
market and protect the privatized SOEs from hostile takeovers (Wu 2007). Although
many of these reasons disappear with the passage of time, authorities continue to
retain control over privatized enterprises by holding a majority of board seats.
Despite the government’s reluctance to release residual state holdings entirely,
often ascribed to a sluggish capital market and difficulties in removing policy duties
from privatized SOEs, critics consider these holdings a form of political patronage;
as Golden (2003) argues, the executive branch of government leverages its power for
the ruling party and serves the electoral needs of incumbent politicians. Therefore,
scandals result when private investors can take advantage of passive government
representatives on the board in the post-privatization period. As this type of inherent
problem of state shareholdings is seen as the ineffectiveness of corporate governance
(Shirley and Walsh 2001), an administrative order9 has been issued as the guideline
for the authorities’ handling of residual state holdings in privatized enterprises. The
second revision of the STSP also empowers authorities to create a ’golden share” to
veto any corporate decisions that breach national security or public interests.
3 Strategic priority for Taiwan’s privatization
The effectiveness of a privatization program may be a function of the pace of its
implementation (Pirie 1988). Speed is of the essence; windows of opportunities do
not stay open very long. Yet an attempt to go too fast also may backfire, as a result
9 Article 10 of the “Guidelines for Managing Residual State Holdings”, which came into effect in Oct.
1999, stipulates that the government can retain share holdings for utility and national defense related
companies to exert substantial veto power on the management of these companies, otherwise, the state-
owned shares of the privatized SOEs in competitive industries shall be successively and completely sold
or transferred in view of the capacity of capital market.
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of inadequate preparation and poor design, lack of response from investors, or lack
of support from key constituencies (Guislain 1997). A drawn-out process can cause
the deterioration of the SOEs, the loss of momentum and support for sometimes
painful reforms, and even the scuttling of the overall program.
When Taiwan’s government revamped its privatization agenda at the end of the
1980s, more than 80 SOEs operated in the market. In the first revision of the STSP
in 1991, the “negative list” of SOEs, those ineligible for privatization, was replaced
by a more flexible regime for the discretionary selection of SOEs to be privatized.
Therefore, the line ministries started to review the situation in a more active manner
and consider which SOEs did not need to remain in state hands.
A series of reviews, conducted by the SCPPS, yielded a list of 47 SOEs to be
privatized (21 after the first review in 1989, increased to 33 in 1993 and then 47 in
1996), though their privatization priority remained unclear. Establishing these
priorities required considering government’s limited resources and the urgency
needed to overcome likely technical and political impediments to privatization. On
the basis of their competitiveness and assigned policy missions, they were divided
into four different priority categories.
3.1 Priority 1: Industrial firms in competitive industries (privatized over 1989~96)
Several SOEs in manufacturing industries had long faced significant competition
from the growing private sector. Their adaptability to this competition and gradually
released policy duty meant that they remained attractive to private investors in the
early 1990s but would not be for long if they remained under state ownership. Six of
these SOEs in fields such as steel, petrochemicals, and construction were privatized
in the first half of the 1990s. They became the first successful cases of Taiwan’s
privatization and enabled bureaucrats to obtain precious hands-on experience from
implementing privatization.
3.2 Priority 2: Financial institutions in increasingly deregulated market
(privatized over 1998~99)
State-owned financial institutions, including banks, insurance firms, and building
societies, became targets in the first wave of privatization because of their high
profitability when regulated and protected. However, the legislature hesitated to
approve budgets for share sales until the constitutional reform in 1997, which
disentangled vested interests. In the following 2 years, nine state-owned financial
institutions transferred into private hands. The smooth privatization of these SOEs
also resulted from the minimal employee opposition, compared with that in other
industries, because of the smaller gaps in both salary and working conditions
between the state-owned financial institutions and those of the private sector.3
3.3 Priority 3: Financially troubled SOEs (privatized over 1999~2004)
As mentioned previously, FTSs are unattractive to private investors unless they first
undergo some restructuring, whether in the form of downsizing, changing
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management, issuing new shares to introduce private capital, or another method.
Several medium-sized SOEs listed as candidates for privatization in the early 1990s
failed to attract investors. The financial condition of these firms worsened during the
economic slowdown at the beginning of the 2000s. Furthermore, the government ran
short of budgets for full-scale bail-outs. Fortunately, the fast-track mechanism for
assisting FTSs, established in the second revision of the STSP, provided PF
financing of ERI payments and thus speeded the privatization of FTSs. Several were
privatized during 1999–2004 (two through employee buy-outs with government
subsidy of employee seniority settlements and redundancy payments).
3.4 Priority 4: Utility companies (yet to be privatized)
Utility companies, including telecommunications, electricity, petroleum, water, and
railways, traditionally are highly regulated industries because of concerns about
national security or the public interest. Privatization of such utility companies
therefore must be pursued in tandem with competition-enhancing policies and
adequate post-privatization regulatory framework designs. Some utilities cannot
function as commercial companies and must be corporatized in the first place, along
with administrative reforms such as imposing more accountability, adopting more
comprehensive performance evaluation, and forcing improvements in productivity—
all of which may assist the cause of privatization.
However, SOEs in this category are not considered priorities for privatization. For
example, the state-owned Chung-Hwa Telecom (CHT) and China Petroleum Corp.
(CPC) originally were chosen among the first wave of candidates and slated for
privatization by the end of 2001, in concert with market liberalization initiatives.
However, Parliament’s interference with share-issue budgets and the downturn of the
capital market postponed the share sales of CHT several times, though its share-issue
privatization finally was completed at the end of 2005. The schedule for CPC
remains stalled, long after the passage of the Petroleum Administration Law that
provided a legal framework for its privatization.
4 Efficacy of policy implementation
Finding an arena in which a meaningful alignment of interests, flowed through the
political system, allows a policy to be developed to its fullest potential remains a real
challenge (Wallin 1997). The privatization agenda in Taiwan, hindered by opposition
parties who traditionally support SOE labor unions, provides evidence of this
challenge. Privatization, similar to other economic or social policies, usually results
from goodwill, but the outcome relies mostly on its implementation.
4.1 Costs and revenues of privatization
A well-designed and effectively implemented policy should take into consideration
both costs and benefits, and the latter should outweigh the former for the policy to be
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viable. Privatization in Taiwan has made significant contributions in terms of raising
revenue for the government and supporting the development of the securities market.
By the end of 2005, 39 SOEs in various industrial sectors had been privatized
through more than 60 offerings and several sales of assets. Sales of government
ownership stakes have yielded cumulative proceeds of close to NT$400 billion (US
$11.35 billion), equivalent to 1.56% of the total revenue of the national treasury
from 1989 through 2004. Table 3 shows the accomplishments associated with
Taiwan’s SOE privatizations.
Although one of the policy goals of Taiwan’s privatization was to relieve
budgetary constraints, and privatization proceeds since 1989 have helped do so,
compensation to employees has become a black hole for government revenues
because of increasing distortions in legislation in response to lobbying from SOE
labor unions. Tables 4 and 5 show the costs and revenues of Taiwan’s privatization.
The percentage of privatization receipts used to compensate employees reaches as
high as 36%, echoing the observation by John Moore, a senior member of the U.K.’s
Thatcher government in the mid-1980s, that “public sector labor unions have been
extraordinarily successful in gaining advantages for themselves in the pay hierarchy
by exploiting their unique bargaining position” (Moore 1986).
4.2 Performance measurement of privatization
Empirical studies of SOE efficiency began in earnest after Alchain (1965) predicted
that SOEs would be inherently less efficient than private firms. The wave of
privatization in developed countries during the 1980s, particularly in Great Britain,
provided a new avenue for empirical investigations of the performance changes
before and after privatization (Martin and Parker 1995) that indicated private or
privatized ownership was superior to state ownership in a variety of situations.
However, many SOE proponents still contend that market failures in developing
countries make SOEs more viable choices than the private sector. This section
avoids an exhaustive presentation of the empirical results from privatization studies
in advanced or developing countries, because such summaries already appear in
many articles in this stream of research (e.g., Megginson et al. 1994; Boubakri and
Cosset 1998; D’Souza and Megginson 1999).
Traditionally, financial indicators measure the economic performance of a firm,
though they represent only part of how firms perform compared with their
competitors. This study instead measures more objectively the performance changes
of privatized entities on financial, operating, and market dimensions by adopting
three groups of indicators which represent profitability, productivity, and returns to
the investor. The empirical proxies used for the three performance measurement
dimensions appear in Table 6.
Following the approach of Megginson et al. (1994), we develop a performance
“time-line” to reflect the operating results of each sample whose the means of each
variable over the 3-year pre– and post–privatization windows are calculated (the
privatization year is excluded). For a given sample firm, a comparable industry
average, computed at the 3-digit standard industrial classification level, is used to
deflate the absolute changes of pre– and post–privatization performance variables.
The relative measurement thereby reflects more objectively the performance changes
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relative to the market movements and eases the influence of the business cycle
during the pre–or post–privatization period. Thus,
Performance changei ¼ ðPij  PjÞpostprivitization on periodðPij  PjÞpreprivitization on period
where Pij is a performance proxy for firm i in the industry j.
All proxy variables come from company prospectuses or annual reports. Some
data refer to the Taiwan Securities & Futures Information Center; for those
companies not listed, the data come from the archives of the Council for Economic
Planning and Development.
4.3 Performance effects of privatization
Table 7 details the performance changes associated with 39 privatization cases in
Taiwan in both absolute and relative terms. The latter measure attempts to minimize
relative market movements in the pre– or post–privatization periods, which may
cause misinterpretations of policy ineffectiveness. In terms of financial performance,
less than half the sample enjoys improved returns on equity and returns on sale after
privatization in absolute terms (i.e., directly comparing the three-year average of the
pre– and post–privatization periods). In particular, in the financial services
industries, both indicators reveal performance deteriorations after privatization. The
absolute measurement, which does not take into account industry-wide market
conditions, inevitably raises doubts about the policy efficacy of the performance
Table 5 The proceeds of Taiwan’s privatization
Revenues (US$ million) 11,356.9




Manufacturing (19) 4,160.6(5) 345.8(9) 2.4(4) 0.05(1)
Financial services (13) 6,536.4(13)
Transportation (5) 287.1(2) 7.5(2) 3.5(1)
Others (2) 0.69(2)
The figure in parentheses represents the number of privatized entities
(US$ million)
Direct costs 4,085.3






Table 4 The direct costs of
privatization
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gains originally expected by policymakers. In the same table, the results of the
relative measurement of performance indicate that absolute performance changes are
deflated by industry averages in the corresponding periods. The financial indicators
demonstrate that more than half of the samples experience positive changes in the
post-privatization period.
As prior studies of privatization (e.g., Martin and Parker 1995; Ramamurti 1996;
Dewenter and Malatesta 2001) have widely documented significant post-privatization
improvement in labor productivity, efficiency gains reflect not only the growth of sales
or profit but also the effect of layoffs, often observed in privatized enterprises. The
direct and relative measurements of two operating performance indicators, namely,
sales efficiency and net income efficiency, generate similar outcomes: Most samples
enjoy efficiency gains, particularly when market cyclical movements are taken into
account.
Turning to the market performance represented by returns to investors (including
price appreciation and dividend yield), only 10 of the 39 samples show improve-
ments in the direct comparison of stock appreciation during the pre- and post-
privatization periods. The results illustrate the unfavorable conditions of the
traditional industries in which most former SOEs operate. However, this study also
examines how market investors value those former SOEs by deflating the direct
measurement according to comparable industry averages. The relative measurement
shows that only 9 samples underperform compared with pre-privatization levels
when the relative movement of comparable private counterparts in the same period is
considered. For these examples, mostly in the financial services industry,
unsatisfactory returns on stock may result from the dramatic market changes caused
by the financial liberalization initiative in the early 1990s. That is, in addition to the
Asian financial crisis in late 1997, new entrants and ensuing competition drove down
industry-level profitability and made financial institutions unattractive choices in the
stock market. The results of the relative measurement of performance changes also
show that privatized companies increasingly are subject to market fluctuations.
These findings exonerate the government from accusations that some privatized
entities suffered performance deteriorations as a result of its policy ineffectiveness.




1. Return on equity (ROE) = Net income / Equity
2. Return on sales (ROS) = Net income / Sales
Operating efficiency 1. Sales efficiency = Sales / Number of employees
2. Net income efficiency = Net income / Number of employees
Market performance 1. Price appreciation = (adjusted stock price at the t year-adjusted stock price at the
t-1 year) / adjusted stock price at the t-1 year.
2. Dividend yield per share
1. All current-dollar measures are adjusted by the inflation index before the mean values of the three-year
event window before and after privatization are computed;
2. Each sample company’s stock prices were adjusted for the corresponding market trends. “De-trending”
was accomplished by using TaiSEC’s industry classification indexes.
3. For unlisted companies, stock price is replaced with net value per share for the stock price appreciation
computation.
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4.4 Subconclusions
When the three types of performance measurement are adjusted for market effects,
the results of the relative measurement indicate more significant performance gains
after privatization, relieving some of the doubts about the efficacy of privatization in
Taiwan. Although the performance implications of privatization in Taiwan conform
in general to the Western experience, the data in Table 7 also show that ownership
change itself cannot guarantee absolute success, according to the three types of
performance indicators. As Wu (2006) argues from a policy-fit perspective,
matching the privatization policy with other industry-wide or company-specific
policies collectively determines the outcome of privatization. In an empirical
analysis of privatization cases in Taiwan, he concludes that post-privatization market
openness and pre-privatization corporate health, along with the privatization of
certain SOEs, relate positively to efficiency gains after privatization, which implies
the indispensability of market deregulation and SOE reforms in government
divestiture policy designs. In addition, the efficiency effect of continued state
presence (i.e., the percentage of board seats appointed by the executive branch of
government) is moderated by market openness; therefore, government involvement
may become a passive or even benign factor for management decision making if
market competition exists. In contrast, state presence on boards becomes less critical
for efficiency gains in weakly contested markets.
With this approach to the research theme, this paper presents only a basic profile
of the performance effects of privatization as one of the pillars of Taiwan’s policy
framework. A detailed and rigorous analysis of post-privatization performance
changes in Taiwan already appears in some research in this field (e.g., Wu 2006
2007) and is beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Prospects and policy implications
As Peter Evans has written, “exogenous inspirations ... build on indigenous
institutional foundations“ (Evans 1995: p.243). Taiwan appeared to be modeling
its policy design on those established by advanced countries, particularly in Western
Europe, even though its policy implementation diverges in some respects from the
Western experience because of the compromises necessary when it has proved
difficult to negotiate change both within and outside political and administrative
structures.
Accordingly, the progress of privatization in Taiwan has not proceeded as rapidly
and smoothly as the government had originally expected. While privatization has
been an official policy for nearly two decades, by the end of 2005 only 39 chosen
SOEs (excluding some small scale plants) had been transferred to the private sector,
leaving some twenty SOEs to be privatized. Though the road to liberalization has
been littered with obstacles, thrown in the way are inexperienced executive officials,
the opposition from legislative branch and SOE labor unions, the capital market, and
other vested interests, the trend is now clearly irreversible, and the government is
believed to fulfill doubtlessly its privatization commitment for the rest selected
SOEs.
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Much has been learned about privatization as a financial means to serve economic
and political ends in advanced and developing countries (Jones et al. 1999), but
Taiwan’s policy design offers several additional implications that should remind
developing countries of the need for careful—not just lucky—decision making.
First, privatization efforts should work in concert with other policy measures.
Recognizing that ownership change alone cannot ensure successful privatization
outcomes, Taiwan has aligned its program with policy measures aimed at market
liberalization. As Taiwan’s experience shows, mere ownership change in sectors that
lack substantial competition is insufficient to bring about market-imposed discipline
and consequently better performance outcomes. The experience of other countries
also suggests that small and medium-sized SOEs should be sold “as is” and as
quickly as possible; new investments should be left to private owners after the
decision to privatize the enterprise (Kikeri et al. 1992). As Taiwan’s experience
demonstrates, the financial health of a SOE is indispensable in the run up to
privatization; without it, the company will suffer a more difficult position after
privatization. A fast-track mechanism to force reforms on financially distressed
SOEs prior to privatization should be built into policy implementations.
Second, strong political commitments are required for a successful policy
implementation, because privatization is almost never painless. Most transactions
produce both winners and losers, though “win-win” situations occur occasionally.
Privatized firms sometimes end up suffering performance deteriorations, and large-
scale redundancies may take place. Some SOEs must sell their assets at less than
book value, which, though economically justified, leads to allegations of “give-
aways” (Kikeri and Nellis 2002). Furthermore, because efficiency gains are usually
realized and diffused in the longer term, whereas the short-term costs are borne and
stressed by vested interest groups, such as SOE labor unions and politicians,
privatization becomes an intensely politicized issue that requires careful handling by
political and administrative leadership to build widespread public understanding
through transparent policy designs, coalitions for change, and approaches for dealing
with the disaffected. As Taiwan’s privatization experience implies, resolving these
questions requires not only experienced officials but also sustained and dedicated
commitment from the top in tackling the vested interests that threaten to slow or
derail the process.
Third, if privatization involves labor force reductions, the process will be
contentious, but problems can be minimized if the government, and sometimes
private buyers, talk with labor early in the process and jointly work out an acceptable
approach. Because such dialogue can sometimes go to extraordinary lengths, the
most common method to deal with workforce reductions involves lump-sum
severance pay for layoffs or worker training/retraining programs. Taiwan’s policy
design obviously prefers the former to the latter, causing heavy fiscal burdens and
making the scope of compensation an easy target for lobbyists from SOE labor
unions. As suggested by Taiwan’s experience, targeted and demand-driven support
for SOE employees has a better chance of succeeding; counseling and job search
assistance are more cost effective.
Although countries differ in many ways, lessons can be learned from an analysis
of the privatization politics and policy decisions of a country like Taiwan, in which
the executive branch of government has aggressively pursued privatization while
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SOE labor unions equally aggressively have opposed it, even as the legislative
branch of government continues to intervene. Although a country-specific study has
its limitations, such studies are clearly instructional regarding the early years of
policy development for other developing countries.
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